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The Effect  of Feedgrain Program
Participation on Chemical  Use
Marc 0.  Ribaudo and Robbin A.  Shoemaker
Economic  incentives  created  by  the commodity  programs  are hypothesized to cause program
participants  to apply agrichemicals  at  greater rates  than  nonparticipants.  Corn producers  who
participate  in the  USDA feedgrain  program  are shown to apply nitrogen,  herbicides,  and
insecticides  at statistically  greater rates  than those  who do  not participate.
The  design  of U.S.  commodity  programs  creates  contingent on setting aside a percentage  of the pro-
economic  incentives  and  conditions  that  result in  gram  base  acres.  Participation  in  the  deficiency
higher per-acre  chemical use  on commodity  crops  payment  program  is  voluntary  and  therefore  the
than would occur under free-market conditions.  In  program  needs  to  be  sufficiently  generous  to  in-
this  analysis,  cross-sectional  data  from  the  1991  duce participation.  A consequence of the program
and  1992  Cropping  Practices  Surveys  are used  to  provisions  is  the  creation  of  distortions  in  farm
test for differences  in chemical  use in corn produc-  production.  These  distortions  are  a  source  of the
tion between participants in the feed grain program  intensification  of input use.
and  nonparticipants  (NASS/ERS).  Corn  is  the  The distortions can be shown by comparing  the
most  important  U.S.  crop  in  terms  of  chemical  firm optimization decisions with and without farm
use.  Over  half of  all  pesticides  applied  to  field  programs.  Our illustrative model assumes a single-
crops are applied to corn, and more than 60 percent  product  firm  using  two  variable  inputs,  land  and
of nitrogen  fertilizer.  nonland,  denoted A  and X respectively.  Output  is
produced by a neoclassical  production function de-
fined  as F(A,X)  with the usual properties,  Fi > 0
Background  and Fii < 0, where i = A, X and subscripts denote
derivatives.  The  firm  maximizes  profits  in  per-
U.S.  commodity  programs  are designed  primarily  fectly competitive product and factor markets. The
to provide price and income protection for farmers,  firm's  maximization  problem  and  optimality con-
to assure the nation an abundant and low-cost sup-  ditions  are:'
ply  of food and  fiber  (Langley  et  al).  One justifi-  X)
cation  for  government  intervention  includes  the=  -
perception  that farmers  are  an economically  hard-  (2a)  7rA =  pFA  - =  0
pressed  group that  would be subject  to intolerable
instability in commodity  markets  without govern-  (2b)  x  = pFx  -w  =  0
ment intervention  (Langley et  al).  Income support  where p is the commodity price and v and w  are the
is achieved by government intervention in the mar-  market  prices of land (rental)  and nonland  inputs.
ket to raise prices received  by producers.  Several  From  (2a)  and  (2b) the usual  first-best  efficiency
mechanisms  are  used.  For feedgrains  a combina-  condition  is:
tion of loan rates  and target prices raise the effec-
tive market price  a participant  in the  program  can  FA  v
expect  to  receive.  To  limit  the  accumulation  of  3  -
surplus  stocks,  deficiency  payments  are  usually  (x  w
The  authors  are  agricultural  economists  with  the  Economic  Research  This  simple  model  treats  land  essentially  as  a  variable  input,  ab-
Service,  Washington,  DC.  stracting  from the issues of land investment and  adjustment cost making
The authors  acknowledge  the  helpful  comments  of three anonymous  this  is  a  long-run  comparative  static  model.  The  efficiency  effects  of
reviewers.  commodity  programs  have  been  examined  elsewhere,  (Shoemaker
The views  expressed  in this paper  are  the authors'  and do  not neces-  1993),  in  a model with land and  durable capital  investment  with adjust-
sarily  reflect the views of the  U.S. Department  of Agriculture.  ment costs and finds  the similar results to the ones  in this simpler model.212  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
where the marginal  rate  of substitution equals  the  price.  The willingness-to-pay for land and nonland
market  factor price  ratio.  inputs  are expressed  as:
The deficiency payment programs have been the
primary  income  transfer mechanism  in U.S.  farm  (7a)  -
policy. As such, it is the instrument through which  (FA  -0)
most agricultural policy oriented distortions  occur.
The  deficiency  payment  provisions  also  involve  (7b)  pFx = w
cropland  set-asides.  Deficiency  payments  are  the
product of the deficiency rate and program produc-  Equations  (7a)-(7b) indicate  that the  first-best ef-
tion.  The deficiency  rate is the difference  between  ficiency  conditions  are  violated.  The MRS/effec-
the target price, p, and the higher of the five-month  tive price ratio for this  case is:
weighted national  average market price or the loan
rate.  (For brevity's  sake  we  will  assume  that the  (8)  FA  v
market  price is greater than the loan rate through-  Fx  w(l-0)
out  the paper).  The  level  of production  used  for
calculating program payments is determined  as the  The user cost of land is increased  because the mar-
product of the program yield and allowable planted  ket price  v is  divided  by (1  - 0).  The increase  in
acres  (base  acres  minus  set-aside).  Of  course,  if  the user cost of land reflects the opportunity cost of
the  market price exceeds  the  target price,  there is  the  set-aside requirement.  For the producer that  is
no deficiency  payment.  willing to participate  in the program,  the opportu-
Over  the years  the  formula  for calculating  pro-  nity  cost  of  the  set-aside  is  compensated  at  the
gram payments  has  changed.  Prior  to  1981,  defi-  margin by the target price.  The important point to
ciency payments were  based on proven yields  and  note  is that the  effective cost  of the nonland  input
payment acres (base acres net of set-asides),  where  falls relative to the rental cost of land,  resulting  in
proven yields  are the average products  of effective  an  intensification  in  the  use  of  non-land  inputs
land  in  production.  Noting  that  payment  yields  (chemicals,  for example).
were average products,  the deficiency payment can  In  the  1985  Farm Bill,  in  an  attempt to reduce
be expressed  as,  budget exposure  and to reduce  the direct incentive
effects  of deficiency  payments on  production,  the
F(A(1  - 0),X)  yield basis for payments was frozen  at the average
(4)  DP =  ~  P  (A(I  - 0))  A  - 1981-1985  level.2 It  has  been  suggested  that  by
fixing  the payment yield,  the  distortionary  effects
indicating  that payments were based on actual pro-  of the program are eliminated.  From the first order
duction.  Since  deficiency  payments  were  deter-  conditions  below we see  that while the  more overt
mined  by  the  payment  yield  (actual  production)  incentive  effects  have  been  reduced,  distortions
and  acres,  payment yields were endogenous.  That  still remain.  The firm's  optimization problem  and
is,  producers  had  the direct  incentive  to  increase  first-order  conditions  are,
yields  and their payment rate by adjusting variable
inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides to enhance  (9)  rr  = pF(A(1  - 0),X)  + (p - p)
yields.  In this  case,  the profit  and first-order  con-
ditions  are:  y(l - 0)A  - wX  - vA
(5)  r  = pF(A(l - 0),X)  + (p - p)  (a)  rA  =  (1 - pFA  + (  - p)y  v 
F(A(1  - 0),X)  - wX  - vA
(6a ^  A-pFA~l-O)-  ~  (lOb)  Trx=pFx- w =  0 (6a)  rA  = PFA(1  - 0)  - v  = 0
where  y  is  the  fixed program  yield  and  0  is  the
^(6b) 7  _=  iFx - w =  acreage  set-aside  rate.
Trx  p-Fx - w  - 0  The  MRS/effective  price  ratio  for this  case  is
expressed  as,
where  0  is the set-aside  rate.
Assuming the  target price,  )p, exceeds  the mar-
ket price,  the target price becomes  the operational  2 Between 1981  and  1986,  the payment yield was  based on a five-year
marginal price,  i.e.,  the  price at  which  producers  moving average  of actual  yields.  Shoemaker (1992)  examined this pay-
make decisions  at the margin.  The marginal  ivalue ment scheme  and found the distortionary  effects as an intermediate  case make decisions  at the margin.  The marginal  value  between  payments  based  on  actual  production  and  fixed  (exogenous)
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(  p  )i  - 0)-  -I—  (Tp  -— p~become  based on market prices.  However,  if there
^  Fx  W  ~p  =  —is  any expectation  that Congress might lift the ban
or that the Secretary of Agriculture might exercise
The MRS  shows that program-induced  distortions  his/her  authority  to  update  the  payment  yields,
are not eliminated.  Equation (lOa) can be rewritten  then  the  incentive  exists  for  maintaining  high
as,  yields (Thayer, Zulauf,  Schnitke, and Forster). Ef-
fective  price  is  determined  partially  by  the  target
(lOa')  pFA(l  - 0) = v  - (p5  - p)5(l  - 0)  price.
Another possible  consequence  of the programs
The term  on the  left-hand-side  is the  willingness-  are disincentives  to adopt rotations.  Program pay-
to-pay  for  land  or  the marginal  value product  of  ments  are linked to the quantity  of base acreage  a
land  in production  where  value  is  determined  by  farmer maintains. The consequence of this is a loss
the  commodity  market  price.  The  willingness  to  of flexibility  in cropping  decisions  (Reichelderfer
pay  for land  is  equal  to  the two  components  that  and  Phipps).  Planting  a different crop on program
are  on the right hand side.  The first is the  market  base  acreage,  even  if  it  is  a  part  of  a  rotation,
rental price of land which is reduced by the second  results  in the  loss of the opportunity  to collect fu-
component,  the marginal  deficiency payment. The  ture deficiency  payments.  Rotations  are an impor-
marginal  deficiency  payment  is  that  component  tant  measure  for breaking  pest  cycles  and  provid-
which drives a wedge between the market price for  ing  carryover  nitrogen.  Failure  to  rotate  could
land  services,  v,  and  the  effective  price  partici-  therefore  be  linked  to  higher  use  of  purchased
pants  pay,  v  - (p  - p)y(l  - 0).  The marginal  chemical  inputs.
deficiency  payment,  or  wedge,  reduces  the  user  Previous  research  has  looked  for program  im-
cost of land,  which  again  violates  the  Pareto tan-  pacts  on  chemical  use  with  time  series  data  on
gency conditions. Therefore,  the program still  cre-  aggregate  chemical  expenditures  or  aggregate
ates production  distortions'.3 chemical  applications.  In  general,  changes  in
The  evolution  of  the  deficiency  payment  chemical  use patterns over time were  evaluated  in
schemes over the past several decades has resulted  relation  to  changes  in  commodity  programs.
in removing  the  direct incentive  effects  of having  Osteen  and  Szmedra  could  not  support  an  argu-
payments based directly on endogenous yields.  Al-  ment for  the deficiency  payment program having
though the current deficiency  payment  is "decou-  an impact on pesticide use with the time-series data
pled"  from production  in the sense  that there  are  available in 1988. However,  they argued, based on
no  endogenous  variables  within  the  deficiency  non-statistical  analysis,  that  target  prices  appar-
payment calculation,  it still distorts  relative  factor  ently  have  little  effect  on  pesticide  use.  Carlson
(and  commodity)  prices.  The current  scheme  also  reported small but statistically significant increases
provides  indirect  incentives or opportunities  to in-  in pesticide use  in corn and  cotton due to the  1981
crease  the use of variable inputs  by providing  ad-  farm  program.  Richardson  found  some  evidence
ditional  income  which  reduces  capital constraints  that  acreage  restrictions  increase  pesticide  use
and  increases  the  availability  of credit.  However,  based on elasticities  of substitution believed to ap-
the  set-aside  requirements limit  producers'  ability  ply  in the  late  1960's.  Offutt  and  Shoemaker,  in
to expand  land inputs  to the  same  degree  as  non-  examining  the  impacts  of technology and policies
land  inputs,  therefore  producers  may  use  more  over  time  on  the  share  of  land  in  the  value  of
variable inputs  per acre.  agricultural production,  found that set-asides result
The yield  freeze  was  intended  to be  only  tem-  in  an  increase  in  the  value  share  of  land  and  a
porary,  for 2  years.  The freeze  initially had little  subsequent  increase  in use of material inputs.
affect  on  producers,  since  program yields  always  While the above studies were able to make some
lagged  behind expected  actual  yield  (Hertel,  Tsi-  assessment  on the possible impacts  on commodity
gas,  and  Preckel).  However,  as  the  freeze  was  programs  on chemical  use,  the  aggregate  data did
maintained  beyond  2  years,  and  appeared  to be-  not  allow a direct  comparison of participants  and
come  permanent,  producer  decisions  should have  nonparticipants,  nor for evaluating  those resource
and technology  factors that might also lead to dif-
ferences  in  chemical  application  rates.  A  great
The  introduction  of normal  flex  in the  1990  Farm  Bill  has  not  many  factors  have  to  be accounted  for in  explain-
changed  the basic  result. Normal  flex reduces the acre  payment rate by  ing  chemical  expenditures  or  use  over  time,  in-
the normal flex rate,  currently set a 15 percent.  The normal  flex reduces  cluding changes in commodity programs,  weather,
the marginal  deficiency  payment by the flex acre rate,  i.e.,  the marginal
deficiency  payment becomes,  (T - p)y(l - 6 - 8),  where 8 is the flex  output and input prices,  and chemical  products  on
acre  rate.  the  market.  The cross-section data available  since214  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
1990 makes  it easier  to directly  compare program  use of conservation tillage,  and use of soil nutrient
participants  and  nonparticipants,  and  virtually  re-  testing.
duces  the need to control  for differences  in prices.  Since cross-section  data  are being  used  to esti-
In  1991  the  loan  rate  for  corn  was  $1.62,  the  mate  the model,  prices  can  be assumed  to be the
target  price  $2.75,  and  the  set-aside  requirement  same for  all producers.  This  leaves  differences  in
7.5  percent.  Average  market  price  over the  1991  chemical  use to be explained  by  resource  charac-
crop  year  was  $2.37.  In  1992  the  loan  rate  was  teristics,  technology,  and participation  in the  pro-
$1.72,  the  target  price  $2.75,  and  the  set-aside  gram.
requirement  5  percent.  Average  market price was
$2.10. In both years,  those who participated in the
program received  a deficiency payment and had to  Data
set  aside  a portion of their  productive  land.
The data for this analysis come from the  1991  and
1992  Cropping  Practices  Surveys  conducted  by
Model  NASS  and  ERS.  The  Cropping  Practices  Survey
collects  data  on  nutrient  and pesticide  usage  and
If  program  participants  are  applying  chemicals  . other related  practices  on  major  field  crops.  The If  program  participants  are  applying  chemicals more  intensively  than  nonparticipants,  then  this  survey does not represent the total U.S.  acreage of more  intensively  than  nonparticipants,  then  this
should be  revealed by their respective  derived  de-  each crop,  but does  represent  a major portion  A
mand  functions for chemicals.  Demand for chem-  random sample of fields was selected for each crop
icals for an individual producer  can  be defined  as:  so that the probability of selecting a particular field icals for an individual producer can be defined  as: was directly proportional  to the total acres planted
Xi = f(Wi  Wn,  ,  . . . Zi .)  to that crop. Results from the survey can be used to
make  state-level  estimates  about  each  crop.  The
where:  surveys  did not collect financial or production  cost
data.
Xi  =  input use  per acre  For  corn,  the  17  major  corn  producing  states
=  input prices  containing  90 percent of the  corn acres planted  in
1991  and 1992  were surveyed.  Over 5700 useable
py  =  output  price  surveys  were obtained  in  1991,  and over  5600 in
1992. Approximately  seventy-percent of the fields
Zi =  yield-influencing  factors  related  to  the  surveyed  were  enrolled in the feed  grain program
resource  base and technology.  each year.
A  simple  comparison  of  participants  and  non-
The  latter  variables  define  such  resource  related  participants  revealed  some  important  similarities
factors  such  as  climate,  soil  quality,  and  water  and differences  that tend to support  the hypothesis
availability.  They  also include  technology-related  that the  participation  in commodity  programs  re-
factors  such  as  adoption  of irrigation technology,  sults in production  intensification  (Table  1).  Note
Table  1.  Comparison  on Participants and Nonparticipants in the Feedgrain  Program
1991  1992
Part.  Non-part.  Part.  Non-Part.
Irrigate  (%)  17  4***  17  5***
Use manure  (%)  15  22***  13  18***
Nitrogen test (%)  44  32***  46  35***
Rotate  (%)  74  78***  76  83***
HEL  (%)  24  15***  20  17***
Residue  (%  cover)  23  19  27  20***
Seeding  rate  (kernels/acre)  24993  24090***  25344  24268***
Yield  (bus/acre)  116  111  146  141**
Own land  (%)  44  46***  45  45
Nitrogen  rate  (lbs/acre)  128.7  115.4***  129.8  116.4***
Herbicide  rate (lbs/acre)  2.81  2.68***  2.88  2.74***
***Significant difference  at  1  percent  level.
**Significant difference  at 5 percent level.Ribaudo and Shoemaker  Feedgrain Program  Effect  on Chemical Use  215
Table  2.  Nitrogen Application  Rate  on  Corn for Grain by  State and Feedgrain  Program
Participation
Application  Rate (lbs/acre)
1991  1992
State  Participant  Non-part.  Participant  Non-part.
Georgia  135.1  145.6  127.4  156.4***
Illinois  159.6  151.1  157.4  141.2***
Indiana  136.2  127.0  140.4  140.6
Iowa  119.6  109.9  113.9  114.2
Kansas  152.2  93.5***  149.7  111.0***
Kentucky  156.4  113.8***  143.8  134.9
Michigan  126.1  97.5***  123.7  101.7***
Minnesota  110.3  101.8  111.4  97.1***
Missouri  139.2  123.8**  137.0  124.4**
Nebraska  137.2  111.9***  137.8  100.4***
North Carolina  98.1  115.2  146.6  149.9
Ohio  159.3  138.6***  162.3  131.7***
Pennsylvania  81.0  79.3  104.9  67.1***
South Carolina  137.4  146.1  135.6  132.0
South Dakota  64.0  65.4  68.7  69.3
Texas  112.6  53.8***  168.8  111.3***
Wisconsin  90.8  76.7**  97.1  83.7**
US  128.7  115.4***  129.8  116.4***
***Significant  at  1 percent level.
**Significant  at 5  percent level.
that  differences  are  reported  only  if  statistically  ing land.  One  would therefore  expect participants'
different  at  the  5%  level,  using  either Chi-square  land to be of generally poorer quality than  nonpar-
or  t  test.  Observations  were  weighted  by  the  ticipants'.  The higher amounts  of crop residue left
weighting  factors  provided  by NASS.  on fields operated  by participants  is further indica-
For both  1991  and  1992 participants  were found  tion of the greater  erosivity of participants'  land.
to  apply  nitrogen  and  herbicides  at  greater  rates
than  nonparticipants.  Participants  also seeded  at  a
higher rate  and used  soil nutrient testing  more  fre-  Nitrogen Use
quently.  Fields operated by participants  were more
likely  to be irrigated,  and  less  likely to  have ma-
nure applied.  Fields operated  by participants  were  Nitrogen fertilizer was  applied to 96 percent of the
more likely to be labeled  HEL by the  SCS.  There  corn acreage  in the states surveyed  in 1991,  and to
was no difference  in crop  yields  in  1991,  but par-  97  percent  of the  corn  acreage  in  1992.  Partici-
ticipants  did  have  significantly  higher  yields  in  pants applied  significantly  more  nitrogen per  acre
1992.  Significantly less  of the  corn  acreage  oper-  than non-participants  on  corn grown  for grain  (as
ated  by  participants  was  in  a  rotation,  although  opposed  to  seed,  silage,  or  sweet  corn)  in  each
most participants  did have  corn in a  rotation.  . year, based on a two-tailed t-test of the difference
The  result  on  HEL  supports  the  findings  of  in  mean  application  rates  (Table  2).  A  state-by-
Shoemaker that a deficiency payment  is  a subsidy  state analysis has a similar result.  Only in Georgia
on land,  and thus allows more  marginal,  less pro-  in  1992  did  non-participants  apply  significantly
ductive  land to  be put  into  production,  assuming  more  nitrogen than  participants.
that  HEL  is  a measure  of  land  quality.4 Acreage  Regression  analysis  was  used  to  determine
control  provisions  also  favor  enrollment  of  mar-  whether  program  participation  was  a  significant
ginal land,  as the opportunity  cost of setting aside  explanatory  variable of the derived demand  for ni-
a portion of such land is less than for higher yield-  trogen  fertilizer.  The derived demand function  for
nitrogen,  with prices assumed to be constant across
producers,  was  specified  as:
4 HEL  is probably  a poor measure  of soil  quality.  Soil  depth,  type,
water  holding  capacity  and  other physical  factors  are  also  important  RATE  =  f(PART,  IRR,  MAN,  TEST,
determinant  of  soil  quality,  but  these  data  are  not  available  for  the
Cropping Practices Survey,  nor is it possible to link these data with other  INHIBIT,  RESIDUE,  ROTATE,
soils databases.  TYPE,  OWN,  HEL,  DRY)216  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
where:  son and  therefore  requires  nitrogen  to be  present
for  a  longer  period  of  time  than  shorter  season
RATE  =  nitrogen fertilizer  application  varieties.  Higher  application  rates  are  required  to
rate  in lbs/acre on  corn for  assure that adequate nitrogen is present throughout
grain  the growing  season.
PART  =  dummy  variable for  Using manure,  using  a soil  test,  using soil  in-
participation  in the feed  grain  hibitors,  being  an  owner-operator,  and  rotating  a
program  legume were expected to have  a negative  influence
IRR  dummy variable  for whether  the  on application  rate.  Animal manure  is  a substitute IRR  ==  dummy variable  for whether the  . .. ,
field  was  . ,  irigatedfor  inorganic nitrogen. Those who use manure as a
field  was  irrigated  so field  was  irrigated  source of nitrogen would require less inorganic fer-
MAN  =  dummy  variable  for whether  tilizer.  Soil  tests  and use  of soil inhibitors can  in-
manure  was  applied to the  field  crease  the  efficiency  of  nitrogen  applications,  if
TEST  =  dummy  variable  for whether a  properly  used.  Owner-operators  were  expected  to
soil nutrient  test was  conducted  apply  nitrogen  more  efficiently  than  non-owner
INHIBIT  =  dummy  variable  for whether a  operators.  Owner-operators  are  hypothesized  to
soil inhibitor was  used to  have a greater level  of concern over the long-term
increase  the  efficiency  of  impacts  of  their  activities  on  the  local  environ-
fertilizer  application  ment,  including  groundwater,  and  are  therefore
RESIDUE  =  percent  of previous  crop residue  quicker  to adopt more  efficient  chemical  manage-
atplanting  .ment  practices  (Lynne,  Shonkwiler,  and  Rola).
at  a  Owner-operators  might also  have more flexibility
ROTATE  =  dummy  variable  form  management  practices
legume was  grown on the  field  than  non-owners,  who  must  often  get  approval
in either of the  previous two  from  the  owner  before  making  management
years  changes.
TYPE  =  dummy  variable  for maturity  About 3 percent of the fields  surveyed were  not
length  of corn  (full or  treated  with nitrogen  fertilizer, resulting  in a data
otherwise)  set that is  left censored  around  0.  The model was
OWN  =  whether  the field  was  owned by  therefore  estimated  as a tobit.  Each year  was esti-
the  operator  mated separately  because  a likelihood ratio test in-
HEL  =  whether  the field  was  dicated  that the  data could not be  pooled.
designated  as  being highly  A potential  problem with  any cross-section  data
edeiae  asbin  higy)  set  is  heteroscedasticity.  If  left  uncorrected,  the
erodible  (soil quality)  tobit  models would  be  inefficient and  inconsistent
DRY  = whether  the  state  was  affected  (Maddala).  Given the specification of the nitrogen
by dry  conditions  at planting  model,  the  only variable  for  which  heteroscedas-
time.  ticity  is  expected  to  be a  problem  is  TEST.  One
would  expect  that  the  application  rates  of  those
All  variables  but  DRY  were  obtained  from  the-  who conduct  a soil test would have a smaller vari-
cropping practices  survey.  DRY was  based on the  ance  around  the recommendation  than  those  who
Palmer  drought  index,  and  was  obtained  from  do  not have as good  information about  soil fertil-
ERS.  Participation,  irrigation,  HEL,  residue,  and  ity.
full  season  maturity  were  hypothesized  to have  a  The  Goldfeld-Quandt  test  was  used  to  test the
positive influence on application rate. Irrigated ag-  null  hypothesis  of homoscedasticity  (Pindyck and
riculture  generally  uses  inputs  more  intensively,  Rubinfeld).  The data have a natural  break around
primarily because  of higher yields.  A field  desig-  the  variable  TEST,  which  is  a  dummy  variable.
nated  HEL  has  higher  erosion  and  runoff  than  The resulting  F test  could  not  reject the  null  hy-
fields without this designation.  Higher runoff and  pothesis,  so  no  correction  for  heteroscedasticity
erosion implies greater nutrient losses that must be  was  necessary.
replaced  through  fertilizer  applications.  Higher  The  estimated  models  are  significant  at  the  1
residue left on the field results in cooler and wetter  percent  level.  A goodness-of-fit  test  gave  values
soil conditions,  and higher organic matter content  between  .09  and  .11  (Table 4).^  These values are
in the soil.  These condition result in less nitrogen
being  available for plant  uptake  (Duffy and  Han-_______
thom). Full  season corn has  a longer growing  sea-  Goodness of fit measure is  sum of squared residuals divided by totalRibaudo and Shoemaker  Feedgrain Program  Effect  on Chemical Use  217
Table 3.  Herbicide  Application  Rate  on  Corn for Grain by  State and Feedgrain Program
Participation
Application  Rate  (lbs/acre)
1991  1992
State  Participant  Non-part.  Participant  Non-part.
Georgia  1.64  0.62***  1.74  1.39
Illinois  3.23  3.01  3.44  3.37
Indiana  3.21  3.10  3.48  3.28
Iowa  3.13  2.94  3.22  3.17
Kansas  2.07  1.59  1.93  1.79
Kentucky  4.30  3.13***  3.46  2.94**
Michigan  2.92  2.71  3.02  2.63**
Minnesota  2.60  2.91  2.62  2.26**
Missouri  2.92  3.26  2.96  2.81
Nebraska  2.23  1.98  2.18  2.03
North Carolina  2.70  2.43  2.78  2.41
Ohio  3.49  3.13***  3.46  3.05***
Pennsylvania  3.19  2.45***  3.19  2.73
South Carolina  2.49  1.72**  2.70  1.80***
South Dakota  2.14  2.04  2.22  1.77
Texas  1.12  1.01  1.46  1.07
Wisconsin  2.51  2.10**  2.56  2.24**
US  2.81  2.68***  2.88  2.74**
***Significant  at  I percent level.
**Significant  at 5 percent level.
low,  even  for  cross-section  data.  Therefore,  em-  cide  application  rates  are  higher for program par-
phasis  is  placed  on  significant  factors  and  unex-  ticipants  than  for nonparticipants.
pected  insignificant  variables.  Most  variables  are  Nationally,  the  application  rate for  participants
significant  at  the  1 percent level  and  had the  ex-  was  statistically  greater than for nonparticipants at
pected sign.  There was  a great deal of consistency  the  1 percent level in both 1991  and 1992 (table 3).
between  the two years.  In  most  states,  participants  applied  herbicides  at
One  interesting  result is that using  a soil  nitro-  greater rates than non-participants.  Participants  ap-
gen  test  was  associated  with  higher application  plied at statistically  greater rates in 6 states in 1991
rates.  Three  possible reasons  for  this  are  that the  and  1992  (at the 5  percent  level).
recommendations  based on the test were geared  to  A tobit model was specified to determine  wheth-
maximizing yields, that the recommendations were  er factors  other than participation  were  the reason
not  followed  by  the  farmer,  or that  farmers  had  for the differences in application rates.  The follow-
been underapplying  nitrogen.  ing model  was estimated:
Program participation  is positive  and significant
at the 1 percent level, even after accounting for the
other  factors.  This result  suggests  that  economic  RATE  =  f(PART,  IRR,  CULT, RESIDUE,
conditions  created  by  the program  increase  fertil-  ROTATE,  TYPE,  OWN,  HEL)
izer  application rates on  corn.
where
Herbicides  RATE  =  total herbicide  application  for
1992 crop year,  in lbs of active
Over  97  percent  of  fields  surveyed  were  treated  ingredient  per acre.
with  at least  one  herbicide.  Twenty-seven  herbi-  PART  =  dummy  variable for
cides were found to be used in corn production.  An  participation  in feed grain
analytic  approach  similar to  the one  used  for nu-  program
trients  was  carried out to test whether  total herbi-  IRR  =  dummy  variable for whether
field  was  irrigated
CULT  =  number  of times field was sum of squares.  There is  no commonly  recognized  goodness of fit mea-
sure  for the  tobit.  cultivated  for weed control218  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 4.  Model  Estimation Results
Nitrogen  model  Herbicide  model
1991  1992  1991  1992
INTERCEPT  115.76***  114.62***  3.04***  3.22***
PART  6.87***  9.93***  0.28***  0.27***
IRR  34.40***  32.61***  -0.38***  -0.60***
MANURE  -23.62***  -21.79***  - _
TEST  8.10***  7.03***  - -
INHIBIT  29.25***  19.27***  - -
RESIDUE  5.97***  0.19  0.51***  0.15***
ROTATE  -4.09***  - 5.60***  - 0.02  -0.10**
TYPE  3.27***  13.48***  0.07***  -0.18**
OWN  -3.78***  -6.93***  -0.20***  -0.19***
HEL  5.42***  -1.99  0.15***  0.10***
DRY  -26.91***  18.87***  -0.94***  0.22***
CULT  - - -0.55***  -0.45***
Fit  0.09  0.11  0.14  0.11
Nitrogen  and herbicide  models estimated  as a tobit.
***Significant  at  I percent level.
**Significant  at 5  percent level.
RESIDUE  =  percent of previous crop residue  The  estimated  models  were  significant  at  the  1
at planting  percent level,  with  goodness-of-fit  measures  rang-
ROTATE  =  dummy  variable  for whether  ing between  .12  and  .14  (Table 4)  Most variables
any  crop  other than corn  was  were  significant  at the  1 percent  level,  and  most
grown  in either of the previous  variables  had the expected  sign.
two years  Participation had the expected positive effect on
yeHEL  =s whether  thefieldwasherbicide  application  rates  and  was  significant  at
HELi gn  whether  as  . theiwas  the  1 percent  level  in  each  year.  Holding  every-
desgnated  as beg highly  thing else  constant,  participants  applied more  her-
erodible  (soil quality)  bicides per-acre  than non-participants.
OWN  =  whether the  field was  owned  by
the operator
TYPE  =  dummy variable  for early or  Conclusions
medium versus full  season
corn.  Commodity programs,  in  this  case the  feed  grain
program,  appear to provide sufficient economic in-
Participation,  having  an  HEL  designation,  centives  to producers  to apply  more  nitrogen  fer-
amount  residue,  and  having  full  season  corn  are  tilizer  and herbicides  than  non-participants.  Even
hypothesized  to  have positive  effects  on  applica-  after  taking  into  account  prices  (by  using  cross-
tion rate.  Assuming  that the  HEL designation  is  a  section data)  and all the  technology/resource  vari-
proxy for soil quality, higher herbicide application  ables  available  on  the  cropping  practices  survey,
rates  are required to assure that expected yields  are  participants were found to apply both nitrogen fer-
achieved.  Leaving crop residue on fields increases  tilizer  and  herbicides  at  higher  rates  than  non-
soil  moisture  and  reduces  the  number of cultiva-  participants,  indicating  a greater  intensity  of pro-
tions, thus requiring  greater reliance  on herbicides  duction.  However,  the  exact  cause  or causes  for
to control  weeds.  this  apparent intensification  of production  cannot
Rotations,  ownership, irrigation,  and cultivation  be determined  from the  data.  The higher applica-
were hypothesized  to have negative  effects on  ap-  tion rates  could be caused directly by the substitu-
plication  rate.  Rotating  crops  with  other  crops  tion  of  chemicals  for  land  as  a  consequence  of
breaks  pest  cycles,  thus  reducing  the  amount  of  program set-aside requirements.  While it is reason-
pesticides required.  Applying  herbicides  in irriga-  able  to assume  that producers  react to the market
tion water  increases  efficiency,  thereby  minimiz-  price because of the freeze on program yields,  it is
ing the amounts required. Cultivation  is a mechan-  possible that an expectation  that the freeze  will be
ical means  of weed control  that is  a substitute for  lifted  or that program  yields  will  be adjusted  are
chemical  controls.  incentives  to maintain  and officially record higherRibaudo and Shoemaker  Feedgrain  Program  Effect on Chemical Use  219
yields.  A better understanding  of the substitution  general.  The environmental  problems  that  would
between land  and chemical  inputs is needed in or-  need to be addressed,  the recommended  farm man-
der to predict how set-aside requirements  affect the  agement  practices,  and  the  appropriate  incentive
use of chemical  inputs.  mechanisms  for getting  farmers to adopt improved
The results indicate  that those who  rotate apply  management  practices  would all  have to  be reex-
less  chemicals,  and  program  participants  rotate  amined if the  structure of commodity  programs  is
less  frequently than nonparticipants.  Even though  greatly  altered.
most  program  participants  do  rotate  corn  (over
70%),  the fact that nonparticipants use rotations  to
an  even  greater  degree  could  be  a  factor  in  the  References
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